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Abstract  
This paper first examines splits and mergers among Kenya’s political parties (and 
inner-party factions) from the restoration of a multi-party system in 1991 until 2007, 
before the turbulent 10th general elections were conducted. It then considers what 
functions “political parties” have in Kenya with special reference to the period since 2002, 
the year in which President Moi announced his intention to retire. A look back at NARC’s 
five years of rule reveals that, although it succeeded in changing the government, NARC, 
as a “political party,” remained throughout an organization without any real substance. 
The paper looks at (1) NARC’s de facto split after its overwhelming win in the ninth 
general election, (2) malfunctions of the anti-defection laws that were introduced in the 
1960s, and (3) Kenya’s election rules that require candidates to be nominated by 
registered political parties in general elections. The paper proceeds to argue that as a 
result of the operation of these three elements, Kenya’s political parties, and especially 
the victorious coalition sides, tend to end up being nothing more than temporary vehicles 
for political elites angling for post-election posts. 
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Introduction 
Observers of Kenyan politics can still remember the excitement that filled the air 
at the end of 2002 when the Republic of Kenya (hereafter Kenya) achieved its first 
radical regime change as a result of its ninth set of general elections
1
. As the result of 
the parliamentary election, the then newly formed political party NARC (National 
Rainbow Coalition) won 133 parliamentary seats out of 222, becoming the nation’s 
ruling political party. NARC defeated KANU (Kenya African National Union), which 
had been Kenya’s ruling party ever since independence in 1963. At the same time, 
Uhuru Kenyatta, KANU’s candidate for the presidential election, who had been named 
to succeed the then president Daniel arap Moi (Kenya’s second president) lost to 
NARC’s candidate, Mwai Kibaki.  
However, not long after it came to power, NARC stopped performing as a 
consolidated political party. The weakness of NARC as a political party can be seen by 
looking at the outcome of a 2007 by-election, this being one of the crucial indicators of 
the party’s strength. The result of the by-election for a parliamentary seat held in 
Kenya’s Coast Province in May 2007 showed, somewhat unsurprisingly, that the winner 
                                                   
1 General elections in Kenya, which consist of parliamentary, presidential, and local elections, 
are held every five years. Parliamentary elections are based on a single-seat constituency 
system. The President is elected directly. In addition, in a presidential election, a candidate 
must win a relative majority of the votes, as well as at least 25% of the vote in at least five of 
Kenya’s eight provinces. To stand as a candidate in general elections, a candidate must be 
nominated by a political party. Until the 2007 general elections, the Registrar of Society 
registered political parties in accordance with the Societies Act. In 2008, president Kibaki 
gave his assent to the Political Parties Act. Under this Act, political parties have been 
registered afresh by the Registrar of Political Parties (Republic of Kenya, 2007).  
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was a candidate nominated by the Shirikisho Party of Kenya, to all intents and purposes 
a regional party that was based in the Coast Province. More telling still was the fact that 
the NARC candidate did not even come in second. Similarly, in by-elections for local 
councilors’ seats held throughout the country on the same day, none of the NARC 
candidates won.  
Yet, NARC continued to be a registered political party. NARC was also the 
official ruling party in parliament from 2002 to 2007. Most of the Kibaki government 
ministers, moreover, officially belonged to NARC.  
What happened to NARC after it won the general elections in 2002? Did any 
change occur in the functions of political parties in Kenya? This paper will examine 
splits and mergers among Kenya’s political parties (and inner-party factions) from the 
restoration of a multi-party system in 1991 until 2007 before the turbulent 10th general 
elections were held. The paper will also attempt to identify what functions “political 
parties” have in Kenya especially with reference to the period following President Moi’s 
declaration of his intention to retire in 2002.  
 
1. From Rifts to a Common Front — Changes in the Strategy of the 
Opposition Parties 
FORD (Forum for Restoration of Democracy) was the cradle of Kenya’s 
democracy movement and provided the basis for the emergence of the first opposition 
party to be formed following the restoration of a multi-party system. FORD attracted 
widespread potential support throughout the nation, except in the then president Moi’s 
home district and the region surrounding that district. However, within a short time 
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following its formation, FORD failed to agree on a candidate to nominate in the 
presidential election. FORD thereupon split into two parties; FORD-Kenya and 
FORD-Asili (see Fig. 1). Most of the executive members of FORD-Kenya were ethnic 
Luos and Luhyas from Nyanza and Western Provinces. By contrast, the executives of 
FORD-Asili were predominantly ethnic Kikuyus mainly from the southern part of 
Central Province. Meanwhile, Kibaki (currently the president of Kenya) quitted KANU 
and formed the DP (Democratic Party of Kenya). Wealthy business persons and well-off 
farmers mainly from Nairobi and the northern part of Central Province became the core 
supporters of the DP. Including Kibaki, who was its chairperson, the DP’s executives 
consisted of Kikuyus, Embus, and Merus from the northern part of Central Province and 
neighboring districts in Eastern Province. This gave the DP an identity as a regional 
party.  
In the seventh general elections in 1992, three regional parties (FORD-Kenya, 
FORD-Asili, and DP) that had split off from the main parties (FORD and KANU) 
ended up contesting KANU as opposition parties. The views of the opposition parties 
were united in that all of them were demanding democratization. However, the 
opposition being divided into several parties, the vote in the elections was split. As a 
result, Moi was re-elected as president even though he received only 40% of the vote. In 
the parliamentary election, KANU also won with 112 seats (out of a total at that time of 
200 seats). 
As Figure 1 shows, as the eighth general elections drew near, the fragmentation 
of the opposition parties became even more pronounced. In the parliamentary election 
of 1997, DP, FORD-Kenya, and the other smaller opposition parties each won from one 
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to 41 seats respectively (in total, around 40% of the 210 seats). However, they again 
failed to bring an end to the KANU-Moi regime. KANU won 113 of the 210 seats, or 
slightly over 50% of the total. Receiving a less than impressive 40% of the presidential 
vote, Moi also was re-elected. “Had the parties been united, the opposition side would 
have won” — that must have been the common realization among the leaders of the 
opposition parties who had undergone the experience of the two general elections of the 
1990s.  
Then, in October 2002, NARC was formed. NARC started as an umbrella 
organization bringing together most of the then major opposition parties. These included 
DP, FORD-Kenya, and a large proportion of the ex-KANU MPs (see the details given in 
section 2). Forming a coalition for the ninth general elections, NARC not only agreed to 
nominate Kibaki as its sole candidate in the presidential election but also eventually 
succeeded in nominating parliamentary candidates of affiliated parties as NARC 
candidates in most of the constituencies. The result was the massive victory won by 
NARC and by Kibaki referred to in the introduction of this paper. 
 
2. Collapse of the Umbrella Party 
However, a look back at NARC’s five years since it became the ruling party 
reveals that, although it succeeded in changing the government, NARC as a “political 
party” continued to remain an organization without any real substance. Let us look more 
closely at this seeming paradox. 
Just before the ninth general elections, a Memorandum of Understanding was 
exchanged among the leaders of the different parties that belonged to the NARC 
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grouping. The memorandum played a key role in the formation of NARC. In essence, 
what the memorandum offered were promises concerning the distribution of political 
posts in the event of a change of government (Badejo, 2006). According to the 
memorandum, as soon as NARC became the ruling party, ministerial posts were to be 
divided equally between the two main factions of NARC (for details about factions 
within NARC, see below). The memorandum also stipulated that a new constitution 
would be enacted within 100 days of the group coming to power. The then draft 
constitution
2
 contained such clauses as the one creating the post of “executive prime 
minister” and other related executive positions, the objective being to reduce 
presidential power.  
Following its formation, NARC contained two main factions. One was NAK 
(National Alliance Party of Kenya), which DP, FORD-Kenya, and other opposition 
parties formed in September 2002 as a means of strengthening mutual cooperation in 
the then forthcoming general elections. The other faction was the LDP (Liberal 
Democratic Party), a new party formed by ex-KANU MPs.  
The LDP itself was consisted of two wings. One of these consisted of ex- KANU 
veteran MPs. Dissatisfied by Moi’s decision to nominate Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU’s 
presidential candidate in the 2002 election, a large number of veteran MPs pulled out of 
KANU to form the new party. They were led by KANU’s then national secretary 
general Raila Odinga.  
                                                   
2
 This Draft is usually referred to as “Ghai Draft” (n.a. 2002). The Ghai Draft, published in 
2002, was adopted with some minor amendments by the NCC (National Constitutional 
Conference) on 23 March 2004. The final adopted version of the Draft is known as the 
“Bomas Draft” (NCC 2004). 
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However, Odinga (the eventual leader of the other faction in the LDP) himself 
was very new to KANU. Odinga was a party leader of the NDP (National Development 
Party) up to March 2002. The NDP was the third largest party in the eighth parliament 
(from 1997- 2002). The NDP was in essence a Luo political party, and most of its MPs 
were individuals from Nyanza Province who had left FORD-Kenya when FORD-Kenya 
split apart. After the eighth general elections in 1997, the NDP decided to merge with 
KANU and Odinga, leader of the NDP, became KANU’s national secretary general. 
Odinga and the ex-NDP MPs in KANU pulled out of KANU to join NARC in 2002 and 
formed the other main faction within the LDP. It was obvious that other than their 
dissatisfaction with the nomination of Uhuru Kenyatta, both of the two main LDP 
factions (ex- KANU veteran MPs and ex- NDP MPs) did not share many other common 
interests
3
 . 
The weakness of NARC as a united entity quickly began to surface. As early as 
January 2003, Kibaki broke his promise regarding the memorandum of agreement 
which, as we saw above, stipulated that “cabinet posts shall be divided evenly between 
                                                   
3
 What made these shifting alliances and changes in party affiliation possible was the 
malfunctioning of the anti-defection laws (Ghai and MacAuslan, 1970, Tsuda, 2005). For 
example, the Constitution of Kenya rules that if an MP leaves the party that nominated him or 
her at the election, the MP loses his or her seat. However, after 2001, there was an increasing 
number of cases of MPs in reality defecting to other parties while keeping their seats, without 
submitting an official letter to the Speaker of the parliament. For example, Raila Odinga, who 
was officially nominated by NARC to stand in the ninth election, held at least three political 
party memberships in quick succession: of NARC, of the LDP, and of a new party (referred 
to later) formed in 2006, all the while without losing the seat that he had won as a NARC MP. 
Other MPs had similar multi-party affiliations. For more details on the anti-defection laws, 
see Tsuda, 2005.  
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NAK and the LDP”. Instead, in the newly formed Kibaki government, NAK members 
greatly outnumbered members of the LDP. Kibaki also gave influential posts such as 
Minister for Justice, Minister for Internal Security, and Minister for Finance to his 
fellow DP members
4
.  
The decisive factor in the actual breakup of NARC was backtracking on the 
undertaking to enact the new constitution that was called for in the memorandum of 
agreement. By the end of 2002, a draft of a new constitution for Kenya was already 
practically complete (see footnote2). However, the NARC cabinet, and especially 
members from the DP, signaled their disapproval of devolution of power from the 
president. As early as February 2003, the then Minister for Justice, Kiraitu Murungi 
(DP/ NAK), remarked that “the NARC government did not promise to enact a new 
constitution within 100 days.” Ex-KANU veteran MPs of the LDP (officially affiliated 
with NARC) sided with Kibaki. The Kibaki-led NAK faction and the ex- KANU 
veteran MPs of the LDP faction formed a common front to fight against the rising 
pressure for democratization through the enactment of a new constitution that was 
designed to reduce presidential power. Let us hereafter call this side the “anti-reform 
forces”. 
Ex-NDP MPs of the LDP reacted sharply to these moves. They supported 
Odinga, who in the memorandum of agreement had been promised the post of prime 
minister. Moreover, KANU, which was by then an opposition party, strongly pushed for 
the enactment of a new constitution. KANU MPs ended up aligning themselves with 
                                                   
4
 As we saw above, the DP was the forerunner of NAK and was also officially affiliated with 
NARC. 
9 
 
ex-NDP MPs of the LDP. Let us call this side the “pro-reform forces.”  
In the end, under the leadership of the Justice Minister, a number of revisions 
were added to the then draft so that the new constitution would not significantly reduce 
the power of the president. In 2005, a draft of a new constitution for Kenya (called the 
Wako Draft) was put to a national referendum (Republic of Kenya, 2005). However, the 
draft, which contained almost no provisions relating to the curtailing of presidential 
power, had been already changed into a document favoring only the “anti-reform 
forces”. Kibaki immediately expressed his approval of the Wako Draft, and NAK MPs 
and ex-KANU veteran MPs of the LDP joined Kibaki in launching a campaign for the 
approval of the Wako Draft. By contrast, the ex-NDP MPs of the LDP and KANU MPs 
took up positions against the Wako Draft (for more details see Tsuda, 2007a, 2007b). 
In the referendum, “No” votes exceeded “Yes” votes by 16 percentage points 
and the Wako Draft was rejected. The referendum, in short, ended in a victory for the 
“pro-reform forces.” The difference between NARC and KANU as far as official party 
identification was concerned was rendered almost meaningless through the heated 
competition over the Wako Draft. 
 
3. Continuing Realignment of Political Parties 
With the national referendum as a springboard, MPs within NARC (and other 
political elites) started forming new political organizations, and the split between those 
who were for the Wako Draft and those who were against became entrenched. Because 
NARC was badly fractured as a political party, its candidate was unable to win in the 
aforementioned 2007 by-elections.  
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As an outcome of the national referendum campaign, the groups opposing the 
Wako Draft, the “pro-reform forces,” started calling themselves the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM). The name “orange” originated from the orange symbol mark 
designated by ECK (Electoral Commission of Kenya) to denote a “No” vote in the 
national referendum on the Wako Draft. Since an unrelated group registered itself first 
as a political party just after the referendum using the same name, the issuance of 
certification as a political party to the ODM was delayed. However finally, in 
September 2006, the ODM was registered under the name Orange Democratic 
Movement of Kenya. The ODM aimed to nominate a sole candidate in the 10th 
presidential election that was expected to be held in December 2007. In early 2007, the 
main political elites joining the ODM consisted of both LDP MPs and some KANU 
MPs.
5
 The leadership of ODM does not appear to have any definite ethnic leanings.  
Meanwhile, in March 2006, the groups supporting the Wako Draft, the 
“anti-reform forces,” formed a new party called NARC-Kenya. Although Kibaki did not 
publicly comment, NARC-Kenya, in effect, decided on Kibaki as its candidate in the 
2007 presidential election. Almost all of the then ministers joined NARC-Kenya. 
However, even then, the MPs who belonged to smaller political parties (for example, 
FORD-Kenya) and who had joined the pro-Wako Draft side in the national referendum, 
had no intention of scrapping their own respective parties and showed no sign of 
defecting to NARC-Kenya.  
A highly accurate indicator of the way this re-alignment of political parties has 
                                                   
5
 KANU was unable to reach a unified intra-party agreement on whether to align itself as a 
party with ODM with the result that some KANU members joined the party on an individual 
basis.  
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taken shape was the pattern revealed in the parliamentary by-elections referred to in the 
introduction. During the five years of the ninth parliament, which was formed out the 
parliamentary election in 2002, 13 seats fell vacant (Four KANU MPs and nine NARC 
MPs have died because of illness or accidents). To fill these vacancies, by-elections 
were held three times in 2003 and twice each in 2004 and 2006. By April 2004, NARC 
candidates had won all the contested seats
6
.  
However, in the latter half of 2004, the political situation changed completely. 
That was when the “anti-reform forces” started rendering the Bomas Draft toothless by 
eliminating articles curtailing presidential power (for the Bomas Draft, see footnote 2). 
In 2004, a by-election was held to find a successor to an MP
7
 who had joined the 
“anti-reform forces”. In the lead-up to this by-election, a “pro-reform” LDP candidate 
received NARC’s nomination by way of an in-party preliminary primary election. The 
“anti-reform” side within NARC thereupon fielded another candidate by allowing a new 
party, the National Labour Party (NLP), to nominate their “anti-reform” candidate under 
the NLP banner. This parliamentary by-election, which was outwardly a contest 
between NARC and NLP, ended in a victory for the NLP candidate. However in reality, 
this election saw the “anti-reform forces” succeeding in maintaining what they saw as 
“their” seat. 
In a March 3 by-election held in Nyanza Province, where “pro-reform” ex- NDP 
                                                   
6
 There were six seats, all of them having fallen vacant because of the deaths of NARC MPs. 
Except for a few exceptions, the elections were head-to-head contests between NARC and 
KANU candidates. 
7
 The MP concerned was Emmanuel Karisa Maitha (DP/ NAK), member for Kisauni 
constituency in the Coast Province. He died of an illness in August 2004. 
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MPs of LDP have their stronghold, the LDP finally nominated its own candidate in a 
move to “maintain their seat”: a seat that had been made vacant by the death of a 
“pro-reform” MP. NARC also fielded a candidate, but the LDP-nominated candidate 
won an overwhelming victory with 90% of the vote. In five by-elections held in July 
2006, NARC-Kenya, which had only just completed its registration as a new party, 
nominated its own candidates and won in three constituencies. KANU took the 
remaining two seats. On top of that, ODM, which struggled to be registered as a 
political party in September 2006, as expected fielded its own candidate for the 
by-election held in May 2007 (in fact he lost, coming in second).  
Thereafter, de facto defections of MPs became common. No MP has ever lost his 
or her seat since 2002 because of his or her “defection.” Reflecting the sharp conflicts 
among NARC MPs in the ninth parliament, not a few MPs sit on either ruling or 
opposition party benches according to the issues being debated. Though the Speaker of 
the parliament has strongly criticized this trend, calling it a form of “political 
nomadism,” there were no signs of it weakening (Daily Nation, June 24, 2005). Only 
Kibaki did not openly declare a willingness to join NARC-Kenya, and steadfastly 
maintained that he was a “NARC MP.” Yet he showed only a tentative interest in acting 
as a fully committed member of NARC, a party that nominated him at the 2002 
presidential election. In fact, before the parliamentary by-elections held in July 2006, 
Kibaki made a campaign speech supporting the NARC-Kenya candidate in his home 
district. NARC was the “ruling party,” holding 130 parliamentary seats, but the 
preponderance had already become only a façade with no reality behind it.  
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4. Lessons from the experience of NARC 
We have looked at (1) NARC’s de facto split after its overwhelming win in the 
ninth general election, (2) malfunctions of the anti-defection laws that began in early 
2000, and (3) Kenya’s election rules that require candidates to be nominated by 
registered political parties in general elections. As a result of these elements Kenya’s 
political parties, and especially the winning coalition sides, tend to end up being nothing 
more than temporary vehicles for political elites angling for post-election government 
posts. 
At least two lessons can be learned from the experience of NARC’s formation 
and subsequent quick division. First, even though promises may be made before an 
election concerning the later distribution of posts, the same promises can be easily 
ignored after the election. Second, if major opposition parties do not succeed in 
supporting a single candidate, especially in the presidential election, they will never win. 
So every time a general election draws near, we can expect to see the political elites of 
both the ruling and the opposition parties accelerate their political realignments as they 
aim for more reliable promises and the formation of a more certain majority under 
current constitutional set-ups
8
. 
When MPs and other political elites are trying to build a majority coalition, it 
makes no sense to form a coalition with a narrow regional and/or ethnic background. 
Within such limitations, it should be possible for a long lasting and regionally 
cross-cutting political organization to emerge. In fact, the axis of conflict between NAK 
                                                   
8
 Whether or not this tendency will persist after the enforcement of the Political Parties Act, 
2007 is a question that will merit very close attention, especially when 2012 draws near. 
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and LDP/ KANU that prevailed from 2003 to 2005 centered not only on the power 
struggles among the political elites but also on the state of progress of democratization, 
which was essentially a debate over whether or not presidential power should be 
significantly reduced.   
Eventually the 10th general elections were fought mainly between ODM and 
another newly formed “political party” PNU (Party of National Unity). The year 2007 
was very important for ascertaining what form of political system, multi-party politics 
being finally restored in the 1990s, would emerge in Kenya. The outcome was “The 
Post- Election Violence.” Yet, it is still meaningful to closely monitor (1) the political 
parties that are formed during the run-up to general elections and (2) the political parties 
that grow during the same period by absorbing and merging with other parties. It is 
always possible that these “political parties” will end up being nothing more than 
temporary vehicles for the leaders of regional parties angling for post-election posts. 
These are in fact “political parties” designed exclusively for winning the election, but 
that manage to replicate, albeit faithfully, only the form of a substantive “political party” 
such as NARC.  
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